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Evaluating and Developing Theories in the
Information Systems Discipline
Nothing is as practical as a good theory (Lewin, 1945, p. 129).

1. Introduction
For many researchers, the development of theory within their disciplines is the central goal (the
“jewel in the crown”) of their research endeavors (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Lewin, 1945; Parsons,
1950; Shapira, 2011). By articulating high-quality theory, they believe they are more likely to
enhance their own knowledge of and other scholars’ knowledge of the domain covered by their
theory. Some also believe they can enhance practitioners’ capabilities to operate effectively and
efficiently in the domain covered by their theory. For these reasons, scholars in a number of
disciplines have, from time to time, sought to articulate the nature of and characteristics of high quality theory (e.g., Blalock, 1971; Dubin, 1978; Fetzer, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Van de Ven,
1989; Weick, 1995, 1999; Whetten, 1989).
In spite of the importance that many researchers ascribe to theory, the development of new theory
and the refinement of existing theories have been relatively neglected features of research within the
information systems discipline. As a result, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, several editors of major
information systems journals appealed for more theoretical contributions to be made to the discipline
(e.g., Webster & Watson, 2002; Zmud, 1998).
To date, only a relatively small number of papers have been published within the information systems
discipline that researchers might use to guide their development of new, high-quality theories and
their refinement of existing theories (e.g., Gregor, 2006; Grover, Lyytinen, Srinivasan, & Tan, 2008;
Markus & Robey, 1988). Moreover, even if information systems researchers were to seek guidance
from other disciplines where attention to theory building has had a longer history, the processes they
might use to develop and refine theories remain an arcane affair (e.g., Dubin, 1978; Freese, 1980;
Sutton & Staw, 1995).
In this paper, I propose a framework and criteria that can be used to evaluate the quality of a theory.
While my framework and criteria build on the work of many other scholars (e.g., see the references
above), I believe my contribution is novel in its reliance on a theory of ontology to provide more formal
and precise foundations for the evaluation of theory. I show how the framework and criteria I
articulate can be employed to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of an existing theory within the
information systems discipline – one that, according to citation evidence, has had a significant impact
on many researchers within the discipline.
I focus on providing a framework and criteria for theory evaluation for four reasons. First, I seek to
provide a means of identifying the likely usefulness of a theory as a basis for predicting and/or
explaining real-world phenomena. Second, I wish to provide a way of pinpointing areas where
empirical tests of the theory are likely to be problematic. Third, I seek to provide a method of
identifying opportunities for refining a theory. Fourth, I wish to provide guidance in relation to the
development of new, high-quality theory.
The structure of the paper is as follow. First, I briefly define some ontological constructs that enable
me to define the meaning I ascribe to the term “theory” and to articulate the framework and criteria I
propose for evaluating the quality of a theory more precisely. Second, I explain the meaning I ascribe
to the term “theory”. Third, I describe the framework and criteria that I propose for evaluating the
quality of a theory. Fourth, I attempt to show the usefulness of the framework and criteria by applying
them to the evaluation of an important, extant information systems theory. Fifth, I canvass how the
framework and criteria can be used to inform the refinement of existing theories and the development
of new, high-quality theories. Finally, I provide some reflections and conclusions.
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2. Some Basic Ontology
Theories provide a representation of someone’s perceptions of how a subset of real-world phenomena
should be described. In this light, they can be conceived as specialized ontologies – instances of a
general ontology (a theory about the nature of and makeup of the real world, in general). For this
reason, I argue that any careful analysis of the notion of and components of a theory has to be rooted in
a rigorously formulated generalized ontology. The elements of a specific theory can then be evaluated
in terms of how well they map to or instantiate this generalized ontology.
In the sections below, I have used a formal, generalized ontology proposed by Bunge (1977, 1979) as
the basis for my analyses. His ontology seeks to “stake out the main traits of the real world…in a
clear and systematic way…to produce a unified picture of reality” (Bunge 1977, p. 5). I have chosen
Bunge’s ontology for two reasons: (a) it is the most rigorously formulated ontology that I have
discovered; and (b) I have found it to be useful in elucidating ideas about theory that, in my view,
have long remained vague and imprecise. Table 1 provides a succinct (and somewhat informal)
explanation of some key constructs in Bunge’s ontology.
Table 1. Some Fundamental Ontological Constructs
Construct

Explanation
The world is made of things. Things can be substantial or concrete (e.g., an information system user
Thing
or a computer); alternatively, they can be conceptual (e.g., a mathematical set or a function). In this
paper, my focus is primarily on concrete things.
Composite Some things are made up of other things (e.g., a system development team, which is a composite
Thing
thing, is made of team members such as programmers or analysts, which are its components).
All concrete things in the world possess properties (there are no formless things). Similarly, all
properties in the world attach to some thing (properties do not exist in isolation from things).
Properties are not things, however; they are separate ontological constructs that describe different
Property
elements (features) of the world. For example, a human (a concrete thing) may possess a property
that he uses an information system, and a computer (a concrete thing) has the property of
possessing a certain amount of internal memory.
Things that possess at least one property in common constitute a class of things. For example, all
Class
humans who use an information system are members of the class of things called “information
system users.”
We “know” about properties of things in the world through our perceptions of them. These
perceptions may be more or less true. The way in which we perceive a property at a point in time (our
representation of it) is called an attribute. Various types of attributes exist:
• Attributes in general are attributes that belong to a class of things (e.g., all humans in the class
“information system users” possess the attribute called “uses an information system”).
• Attributes in particular are attributes that belong to specific things in a class of things (e.g., the
specific person called “John” in the class of things called “users of information systems” possesses
the particular attribute “uses an information system three times each day”).
• Intrinsic attributes represent properties of individual things (intrinsic attribute in particular) or classes
of individual things (intrinsic attribute in general). For example, a specific user of an information
system called “Jane” has the intrinsic attribute in particular of “age=40 years,” and the class of
things called “information system users” has the intrinsic attribute in general called “age”).
Attribute
• Mutual attributes represent properties of two or more particular things (mutual attribute in particular)
or two or more classes of things (mutual attribute in general). For example, system analysts and
information system users have the mutual attribute in general called “level of shared understanding
about the requirements for a new information system,” which will take on a specific value (mutual
attribute in particular) for a specific system analyst-information system user pair).
• Emergent attributes (in particular or in general) are attributes of composite things that do not
belong to their components. Nonetheless, they are related in some way to attributes of their
components (e.g., the work productivity of a system development team has no meaning in terms of
each team member, but it is related in some way to the productivity of each team member).
• Complex attributes (in particular or in general) are attributes that are made up of the conjunction of
simple attributes (e.g., the attribute “system quality” is composed of simpler attributes such as
“response time,” “data accuracy,” ease of use,” and so on).
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Table 1. Some Fundamental Ontological Constructs (cont.)
Construct

Explanation

A vector of attributes in particular represents a state of a thing (its attributes in general along with their
associated values). States can also be conceived as a complex attribute in particular. For instance, a
particular user of an information system has two attributes in particular (measured on a 10-point
State
scale) that relate to the information system: “perceived ease of use = 5” and “perceived usefulness =
8”). The vector (5,8) corresponding to the values of these two attributes represents the state of the
user. The complex attribute in general might be called “perceived utility,” and for the particular user it
has the value (5,8).
Some states of a thing are deemed lawful (they obey natural or human-made laws); others are
deemed unlawful. For instance, natural laws (the laws of physics) restrict the minimum response time
Lawful
that an online information system can achieve. Response times below this minimum amount are
State
unlawful. A social law – legislation to protect the privacy of customers’ data – might constrain an
organization from outsourcing its information systems to providers in certain foreign countries.
An event that a thing undergoes is represented by a change from one of its states to another of its
states (at least one of its attributes changes values). For instance, in light of a user’s ongoing use of
Event
an information system, her perceptions might change from one state (perceived ease of use=5,
perceived usefulness=8) to another state (perceived ease of use=6, perceived usefulness=5). The
event is represented by <(5,8),(6,5)>.
Some events that a thing undergoes are deemed lawful (they obey natural or human-made laws);
others are deemed unlawful. If an event has an unlawful beginning or end state, it will be unlawful.
Some events are unlawful, however, even when their beginning and end states are lawful. For
Lawful
example, “has low experience with an information system X” and “has high experience with an
Event
information system X” are lawful states of a human thing. The event represented by the state change
from “has low experience an information system X” to “has high experience with an information
system X” is lawful; the event represented by the state change from “has high experience with an
information system X” to “has low experience with an information system X” is unlawful.
The history of a thing is a sequence (ordered set) of its states (e.g., the states that a thing traverses
History of a over time are ordered by time). For example, a user’s perceived ease of use and perceived
Thing
usefulness of a particular information system at three points in time might be represented by the
following sequence of pairs: <(5,8),(6,5),(7,5)>. The three pairs show the history of the user.
Two things interact when the history of one thing is not independent of the history of the other thing.
For example, consider two users, X and Y, of a particular information system. If they never meet
during their use of the information system, assume X’s history (at three points in time) of perceived
Interaction
ease of use and perceived usefulness is <(5,8),(6,5),(7,5)> and Y’s history of perceived ease of use
between
and perceived usefulness is <(6,7),(7,7),(7,8)>. If X and Y interact during their use of the information
Things
system, one or both might then have different perceptions about the ease of use and usefulness of
the information system. For instance, Y might assist X to use the information system such that X’s
history is now <(5,8),(6,9),(8,9)>.

In the sections below, I show how Bunge’s ontology can be used to make precise the meaning of
terms frequently used in discussions about theory. I show, also, how this enhanced precision can be
used to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of a theory.

3. Nature of Theory
Different researchers often ascribe different meanings to the term “theory.” Indeed, the extant
literature shows a considerable level of disagreement about what constitutes a theory, and what
constitutes “strong” theory versus “weak” theory (see, e.g., Sutton & Staw, 1995, p. 371). In this
section, therefore, I explain the meaning I ascribe to the term “theory” to provide a context for the
conditions I lay out subsequently for a theory to be considered “strong.”

3.1. A Particular View of What Constitutes a Theory
By theory, I mean a particular kind of model that is intended to account for some subset of
phenomena in the real world. A theory is a social construction (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, pp. 7-10). It
is an artifact built by humans to achieve some purpose. It is a conceptual thing rather than a concrete
thing. Nonetheless, it has a concrete manifestation as a neuronal pattern in some person’s brain.
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By phenomena, I mean someone’s perceptions of facts in the real world – the existence of things, the
properties these things possess, the states these things experience, and the events these things
undergo (see Table 1). The subset of phenomena in the world that the theory is intended to cover is
called its domain. The phenomena in a theory’s domain, in turn, can be partitioned into two subsets:
(a) the focal phenomena, which are the primary focus of the theory; and (b) the ancillary phenomena,
which are somehow associated either directly or indirectly with the focal phenomena.
The phenomena that are the focus of a theory usually apply to things in a class or things in several
classes. Of course, it is possible to construct a theory about the properties, states, and events
pertaining to an individual thing in the world (e.g., a specific person or a specific information system).
For the most part, however, researchers are interested in constructing theories to account for
phenomena that are common to more than one thing.
The phenomena that theories cover may be static phenomena (states of things at a point in time),
dynamic phenomena (events that occur to things), or a combination of both static and dynamic
phenomena. If the theory covers static phenomena, the researcher who proposes the theory should
make clear whether the states of a thing (or things) that are covered are intended to be stable (in
equilibrium) or unstable (in transition to equilibrium). Empiricists who wish to test a theory that covers
static phenomena need to know whether they should measure the phenomena when they are in a
stable state or an unstable state.
By account, I mean a theory assists its users to explain and predict its focal phenomena. Some
researchers argue theories can have still another purpose – namely, to facilitate human
understanding of the theory’s focal phenomena (e.g., Hovorka & Lee, 2010). I do not see how a highquality explanation of focal phenomena can occur, however, without first understanding the focal
phenomena. For this reason, I intend the purpose of explanation to encompass the purpose of
understanding.
By model, I mean an abstracted, simplified, concise representation of something else (phenomena) in
the world. Models help us to comprehend the world by representing only those major features of the
world that are important for our purposes. Often they provide only an approximate account of the
complexity that exists in the real-world phenomena they cover. They compromise precision to achieve
cognitive economy.
Theories are particular kinds of models, however (see Section 4 below). All theories are models, but
not all models are theories. A model must satisfy certain conditions before I deem it to be a theory
(see Section 4 below) – conditions that relate to rigorous specification of its “parts” and particular
qualities of its “whole.” Thus, the existence of a model is a necessary condition for the existence of a
theory, but it is not a sufficient condition. The existence of a theory, however, is a sufficient condition
for the existence of a model.

3.2. Some Prior Notions of Theory
To further clarify my notion of “theory,” consider the taxonomy of theories proposed by Gregor (2006).
Based on an extensive review of prior literature, she identifies five ways in which the term “theory”
has been used: Type I – theories for analysis; Type II – theories for explanation; Type III – theories
for prediction; Type IV – theories for explanation and prediction; and Type V – theories for design and
action.
In my view, those she calls Type-I theories (theories for analysis) are typologies and not theories (see
also Bacharach, 1989, p. 497). Typologies underpin precise definition of the constructs in a theory,
but they lack some characteristics that I deem important to a theory (see my arguments in Section 4
below). Furthermore, in my view, those Gregor (2006) calls Type-V theories (theories for design and
action) are models but not theories. As with typologies, models lack some characteristics that I deem
important to a theory (again, see my arguments in Section 4 below).
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Gregor’s (2006) Type-II theories (theories for explaining) and Type-III theories (theories for predicting)
may or may not, in my view, constitute theories (depending on how rigorously their “parts” have been
articulated and the qualities possessed by their “whole”). For instance, Gregor argues (p. 625) some
types of Type-II theories are used primarily as high-level “sensitizing devices.” They sometimes lack
clarity and precision in relation to their constructs, relationships among constructs, states they cover,
and events they cover. Type-II theories often are used within the so-called interpretivist research
paradigm (Klein & Myers 1999, p. 75). Where rigor is lacking, I see Type-II theories as constituting
models but not theories. Similarly, Gregor argues (p. 626) Type-III theories do not always provide a
clear account of the associations among the constructs they employ. If this is the case, again, in my
view they do not constitute theories. They are models only, because they lack certain qualities
needed to constitute a theory – namely, rigorous specification of all their “parts,” which, in turn,
undermines some qualities of their “whole.”
In short, my notion of theory is best aligned with Gregor’s (2006) Type IV theory – a theory for
explanation and prediction. Nonetheless, my reluctance to ascribe the term “theory” to her other types
of theory (Types I, II, III, and V) in no way is intended to denigrate the significance of these types of
contributions in scholars’ research endeavors. Indeed, Gregor (2006) provides compelling
explanations for why they make important contributions to the development of knowledge. Rather, I
am seeking to be clear about my notion of what constitutes a theory to provide a context for the
arguments I develop below.

4. A Framework and Criteria for Theory Evaluation
In this section, I argue a theory should be evaluated from two perspectives. The first is the “parts” –
the evaluation should focus on the quality of the individual components that make up the theory. I
provide criteria for evaluating these components. The second is the “whole” – the evaluation should
focus on the quality of the theory considered in toto. I also provide criteria for evaluating the whole.
Both forms of evaluation are important in assessing the quality of a theory. It is unlikely the quality of
the whole will be high if the quality of the parts is not high. Nonetheless, high-quality parts are not a
sufficient condition for a high-quality whole. To the extent a model satisfies the criteria for high-quality
parts and a high-quality whole, it can be deemed a theory.

4.1. Parts
All theories have three parts: their constructs; their associations; and the states they cover. In
addition, theories that cover dynamic phenomena have a fourth part – namely, the events they cover.
When evaluating a theory, the focus initially should be on the quality of its parts.
The parts of a theory need to be described precisely because they circumscribe the boundary or
domain of the theory – that is, the phenomena it is intended to cover. If researchers have a clear
understanding of the theory’s parts, they are better able to design tests that fall within the theory’s
domain rather than unwittingly testing the theory in an inappropriate context (a context outside the
boundary of the theory). They are also better able to filter data they have collected so they undertake
tests on only the subset representing phenomena in the domain the theory covers. Indeed, some
scholars argue that a field’s understanding of the boundary conditions associated with its theories is a
good proxy for the quality of its theories and the state of the field more generally (e.g., Gray &
Cooper, 2010, p. 627).
The following subsections explain the nature of each part. They also describe criteria that can be
used to evaluate how well a researcher has articulated each of the parts. Figure 1 provides an
overview of the analysis that follows.
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Figure 1. Framework and Criteria for Evaluating a Theory’s “Parts”

4.1.1. Constructs
A construct in a theory represents an attribute in general of some class of things in its domain (as
opposed to a particular attribute of a specific thing). The classes of things to which attributes in general
pertain ought to be defined precisely to ensure that the meanings of each class and the things in each
class are clear. Otherwise, the exact nature of the things that the theory covers will not be clear.
Moreover, the meanings of the attributes in general that attach to the classes of things the theory covers
are unlikely to be clear. Attributes do not float in the ether; they always attach to things. As a first step in
clarifying the meaning of an attribute, therefore, the thing to which it attaches needs to be made clear.
For example, the well-known Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) is a theory that had in its
earliest versions (and many later versions) only one class of things in its domain – namely, individual users
of some form of information technology. To be a member of this class, things had to possess only two
attributes in general: (a) they had to be humans, and (b) they had to be users of some form of information
technology. Similarly, Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj, and Grover (2003, p. 241) state that their theory covers
only a particular class of things: “…our theory’s boundary condition is firms operating in moderate to rapidly
changing business environments, such as the high-tech, retailing, and financial services sectors.”
Once the meanings of the classes of things that a theory covers are clear, the nature of each attribute in
general that pertains to a particular class ought to be defined precisely. Unless the meanings of the
attributes in general are clear, the meanings of any associations among them will not be clear.
Moreover, developing credible (valid and reliable) empirical indicators of the attributes in general will be
difficult (if not impossible). Interpreting the meaning of data collected about the attributes will also be
difficult (if not impossible).
For example, Davis (1989, p. 320) defines precisely two attributes in general of TAM’s single class of things
(individual users of information systems): (a) perceived usefulness, and (b) perceived ease of use. Variations
in the values of these two attributes in general for particular users of an information technology are the
ancillary phenomena in TAM’s domain. Variations in the values of a third attribute in general, system usage,
are the focal phenomena in TAM (but, interestingly, Davis defines system usage only indirectly in his paper).
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When two or more constructs in a theory represent attributes in general of the same class of things,
care must be taken that the constructs are not different proxies for the same underlying property in
general of the class of things. Otherwise, any association detected between variations in the values of
the constructs simply manifests a variation in the values of a single underlying property in general of
the class of things (in other words, it is a tautological association). Because we can only know the
properties of things imperfectly (hence our use of attributes), the evaluation of whether attributes
overlap in their representation of a property is important but is sometimes difficult to undertake.
For example, in TAM, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and system usage are all attributes
in general of a single class of things (the humans who use some form of information technology). The
value of TAM as a theory depends in part upon these three attributes in general not being proxies for a
single underlying property in general of the humans who use information technologies.

4.1.2. Associations
Associations in a theory can have multiple meanings. When evaluating the meaning to ascribe to an
association, at the outset it is important to reflect upon whether a theory covers only static
phenomena, dynamic phenomena, or a combination of both static and dynamic phenomena. It is also
important to understand whether the constructs represent attributes in general of a single class of
things or multiple classes of things.
If the theory covers static phenomena, an association shows that the values of one construct are
somehow related to the values of another construct. The relationship is intended to reflect a pattern
that is hypothesized to hold across instances of things in the class or classes of things that the theory
covers. For instance, when “snapshots” of the phenomena that pertain to things in a class are taken
at some point in time and the values of attributes of things in the class are examined, the theory might
predict that high values for instances of one construct will tend to be associated with low values for
instances of another construct.
Associations that cover static phenomena can be specified with varying levels of precision:
• Two constructs are simply shown as related to each other, but the sign is not shown.
• The sign of the association between two constructs is shown, which indicates that the
values for instances of one of the constructs are positively or negatively related to the
values for instances of the other construct.
• A functional relationship between two constructs is shown. For instance, the value of
one construct is shown as twice the value of the other construct.
An association that covers static phenomena may show directionality if the values of one construct
are believed to arise prior to the values of another construct. For example, at some point in time some
researchers might seek to test TAM by measuring the values of perceived ease of use, perceived
usefulness, and system usage. Even though they have captured the values of the three constructs at
a single point of time, they might believe that the values for perceived ease of use and perceived
usefulness would have arisen prior to the value for system usage. Thus, they would show
directionality on the association between perceived ease of use and system usage and perceived
usefulness and system usage.
An association between two constructs in a theory that covers dynamic phenomena (events) shows
that a history of values for instances of one of the constructs is conditional on a history of values for
instances of the other construct. In a diagrammatic representation of the association, often an arrow
is placed on the association to show which construct’s change in values precedes the other
construct’s change in values.
As with associations that cover static phenomena, associations that cover dynamic phenomena can
be specified with varying levels of precision:
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• Two constructs are simply shown as related to each other, but neither the sign nor the
direction of the association is revealed. Perhaps uncertainty exists about the sign or
direction of the association. Some indication is given, however, that changes in the
value for an instance of one construct precede changes in the value for an instance of
the other construct, even if the sign or direction is unclear (e.g., the uncertain nature of
the dynamics is explained in a narrative).
• The sign of the association between two constructs is shown, which indicates that
changes in the value for an instance of one of the constructs are positively or negatively
correlated with subsequent changes in the value for an instance of the other construct.
Uncertainty exists, however, about the direction of the association.
• The direction of the association between two constructs is shown, which implies the
existence of causality or shows a time relationship among changes in the values for
instances of the constructs – for instance, changes in the value for an instance of one
construct cause a change in the value for an instance of the other construct, or a
change in the value for an instance of one construct precedes a change in the value for
an instance of the other construct.
• A functional association is shown between two constructs. In other words, the amount of
change that occurs in the value for an instance of one construct is shown as a result of
or subsequent to the amount of change that occurs in the value for an instance of
another construct.
The constructs in an association may pertain to a single class of things or multiple classes of things. If
two constructs represent different attributes in general of a single class of things, any association
between the two attributes implies they are “lawfully” related in some way (association type (a) in
Figure 2). In other words, for an instance of a thing in the class, the value or a change in the value of
one of its attributes is related to a value or a change in the value of another of its attributes.
For example, in Sambamurthy et al.’s (2003) theory, the attributes in general named “digital options”
and “agility” belong to a single class of things (firms of a certain type). Thus, the association that
Sambamurthy et al. (2003) posit exists between these two attributes means they are lawfully related.
They propose a two-way causal (and, therefore, time-sequenced) relationship in which “higher levels
of agility will…enhance digital options” (p. 255) and “the impact of digital options…on agility” will be
positively moderated by a third construct (namely, “entrepreneurial alertness,” which is also an
attribute in general of the type of firm their theory covers) (p. 253).
If two constructs represent different attributes in general of two different classes of things, any
association between them means at least one instance of a thing in one class interacts with at least
one instance of a thing in the other class (association type (b) in Figure 2). In other words, the history
of a thing in one class of things is not independent of some thing in the other class of things. The
nature of the interactions between the two things is manifested in the attributes that are related.
For example, an extension to the original TAM might posit that variations in the measured response
time (as opposed to perceived response time) of online information systems might be associated with
users’ perceptions of these systems’ usefulness. Whereas “perceived usefulness” is an attribute in
general of a class of things called “online information system users,” “measured response time” is an
attribute in general of a class of things called “online information systems.” At least one thing in one
class interacts with at least one thing in the other class. For example, variations in a particular user’s
perceptions of the perceived usefulness of an online information system she is using are associated
with variations in the measured response time of the system.

9
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Figure 2. Two Types of Associations in a Theory
Theories that cover dynamic phenomena (events) sometimes replicate constructs in diagrammatic
representations of the theory and show directional associations between the replicated constructs
(e.g., Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, pp. 159-161). For instance, a theory might be proposed to account for
the evolution of system analysts’ knowledge as they attempt to build an entity-relationship model of
an application domain. Several instances of a construct called “system analyst’s knowledge” might
appear in a diagrammatic representation of the theory, all of which are linked by directional
associations. The theory might show that one value of the construct (e.g., an “entities-known” state)
precedes another value of the construct (e.g., a “relationships-known” state), which, in turn, precedes
another value of the construct (e.g., an “attributes-known” state). In short, when system analysts build
an entity-relationship model of an application domain, the theory indicates that they first acquire
knowledge of the entities in the domain, then acquire knowledge of the relationships in the domain,
and then acquire knowledge of the attributes in the domain.
Alternatively, diagrammatic representations of dynamic phenomena associated with a construct
sometimes use a graph, where the possible values of an instance of the construct are shown on one
axis and time is shown on the other axis (e.g., Monge, 1990, pp. 411-413, 415-419). The graph
shows typical values of an instance of the construct as they unfold over time.
To the extent the nature of the associations among constructs in a theory is made more explicit, morepowerful empirical tests of the theory can be done (tests that are more likely to lead to the theory not
being supported). For example, assume a theory shows only associations or only directional
associations among its constructs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, more-rigorous research designs lead to
weaker tests of such a theory (a paradox noted by Meehl, 1967). The reason is that even a small
amount of covariation between the values of any two constructs in the theory is likely to be detected in
the data obtained – that is, the null hypothesis is likely to be rejected. Whether the covariation reflects
ambient noise in the data (the average variance that is common to unrelated constructs) or the
magnitude of the association detected is practically significant, however, is another matter.
On the other hand, if the theory articulated associations with a functional form (e.g., concave, convex,
stepped linear), posited the values of its associations’ parameters (e.g., two constructs will be associated
with a correlation coefficient of 0.70), or enunciated contingent (moderated) associations, more rigorous
research designs are more likely to lead to obtaining data that shows lack of support for the theory (Edwards
& Berry, 2010; Leavitt, Mitchell, & Peterson, 2010). In other words, stronger tests of the theory are possible.
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Similarly, if a theory is intended to cover a time series of dynamic phenomena (events), stronger tests
of the theory can be undertaken if change parameters are specified more precisely – for instance,
whether the change is continuous, the magnitude of value or state changes at different points of time,
the rate of change of values or states, the trend in values or states, the periodicity of changes in
values or states (length of time between the same or similar values or states), and the duration for
which a particular value of state remains constant (Abbott, 1990; Monge, 1990). The extent to which
these sorts of parameters can be specified precisely, however, depends of the quality of the
“narrative” used to explain the nature of the association (transition) between different values or states
of a construct (e.g., Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999; Poole, Van de Ven, Dooley, & Holmes, 2000).
Usually, a theory does not cover all possible associations among its constructs. Instead, researchers
seek to make astute decisions about what associations to include in the theory and what associations
to omit from the theory. The omission of an association among constructs in a theory does not
necessarily mean none exists among the constructs. Rather, the researcher who proposes the theory
has deemed the association to be outside the boundary of the theory.
Researchers ought to provide compelling justifications for whatever associations they decide to
include within the boundary of their theory. On the one hand, a justificatory narrative may be
compelling because it provides interesting, novel insights about how two or more constructs are
related or a time series of events in a construct unfolds. It engages other researchers because it
reveals aspects of the focal or ancillary phenomena that previously they had not contemplated. On
the other hand, a justificatory narrative may be compelling because it is deemed uncontroversial or it
is rooted in prior, widely accepted research–for instance, prior theoretical work or prior empirical work.
In other words, it is compelling because it is relatively unsurprising–it resonates with knowledge that
other researchers already possess. Whichever justificatory basis is used, the association should be
material. It is included within the boundary of the theory because it is expected to account for a
significant amount of shared variation between the constructs it covers, or it represents a strong
causal link between the constructs it covers, or it shows an important time series of events in a
construct it covers.

4.1.3. States
A theory should specify clearly and as precisely as possible the state space of things in the class or
classes of things that it is intended to cover. In other words, it should stipulate those states that might
arise for things in the class or classes of things that fall within its domain and for which it is intended
to have explanatory and predictive power.
To determine the state space that falls within a theory’s boundary, the range of values that each
construct in the theory might cover first needs to be determined. All combinations of values (the
Cartesian product) for the set of constructs in the theory then need to be considered. The set of
combinations of values constitutes the conceivable state space for the set of constructs in the theory.
Some combinations can be eliminated because they cannot occur naturally (they are unlawful, at
least for the class or classes of things that the theory is intended to cover) and, thus, fall outside the
boundary of the theory. Those that remain must then be evaluated to determine whether they are
covered by the theory. In other words, states that can occur naturally must be partitioned into insideboundary states and outside-boundary states.
To illustrate these concepts, assume we are developing a theory based on TAM about how system
usage will change over time as users of some form of information technology experience changes in
their perceptions of its ease of use and usefulness. At the outset, we might wish to be more specific
than TAM about the class of things (individual users of some form of information technology) covered
by our theory. For example, we might indicate our theory covers only individual users who are rational
according to some criteria, already have some level of exposure to information technology, have
volitional use of a form of information technology designed specifically to support individuals (rather
than groups), work only in certain application domains, and are not subject to intense time pressures
in the tasks they undertake. (Recall, I have argued a high-quality theory will be especially clear about
the class or classes of things it covers.)
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To be congruent with TAM, assume we have only three constructs in our theory (all are attributes in
general of individual users of some form of information technology): system usage, perceived ease of
use, and perceived usefulness. Assume, also, that the three constructs have been defined precisely.
For simplicity, assume we have a valid and reliable measure of each construct, and each measure
uses a 10-point scale (with 1 representing low values on the scale and 10 representing high values
on the scale). In this light, our theory’s conceivable state space contains 1,000 states (10×10×10).
We might then argue some states can be eliminated because they are unlawful. For example,
assume we believe no user who falls within the class of things covered by our theory will have a value
of system usage of 9 or 10, but will have values for perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness
that are both equal to or less than 2. Thus, eight states are unlawful in our theory because we believe
they will never occur “naturally”: (9,1,1), (9,1,2), (9,2,1), (9,2,2), (10,1,1), (10,1,2), (10,2,1), (10,2,2).
For instance, we might believe such states would occur only in relation to users who are irrational or
forced to use the system. We might then conclude, however, that none of the remaining 992 states
falls outside the boundary of our theory – in other words, the set of outside-boundary states is the null
set. In short, we intend our theory to cover all remaining 992 states that might arise as a result of
relationships among the three constructs.
Our TAM example illustrates that practically, for many theories, each state in the set of conceivable
states of a theory cannot be considered to determine whether it falls within the boundary of the
theory. The reason is that the number of conceivable states is too large. Nonetheless, our TAM
example illustrates the kind of clarity about states that theoreticians must strive to achieve in
specifying the boundaries of their theories. While they may find it difficult or impossible to list
exhaustively all the states they need to consider, they might be able to describe the broad
characteristics of states that fall inside or outside the boundary of their theory. For instance, they
might seek to identify the characteristics of extreme-value states or unlikely states and to indicate
whether such states fall inside or outside the boundary of their theory. Crafting a clear narrative to
describe the subspace of the conceivable state space that the theory covers is often a difficult task.
Perhaps for this reason, consideration of a theory’s inside-boundary states is often missing or treated
only cursorily in theoretical accounts.

4.1.4. Events
If a theory is intended to cover events, the event space that falls within the theory’s boundary must
also be articulated. At the outset, all conceptually possible pairs of inside-boundary states must be
considered (recall, each event can be conceived as a before-state, after-state pair). These constitute
the conceivable event space covered by the theory. Some combinations can be eliminated because
they cannot occur naturally (they are unlawful). Those that remain must be evaluated to determine
whether they are covered by the theory. In other words, they must be partitioned into inside-boundary
events and outside-boundary events.
To illustrate these concepts, consider again our putative theory based on TAM about how system
usage will change over time as users of some form of information technology experience changes in
their perceptions of the technology’s ease of use and usefulness. Recall, we have 992 insideboundary states in our theory. In this light, the conceivable event space in our theory contains
984,064 events (992 before-states×992 after-states). We might conclude initially that some of these
events are unlawful because they cannot occur naturally for users in the class of information
technology users who fall within the boundary of our theory – specifically, those events that involve
(a) an increase in the values of both perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness but a decrease
in the value of system usage, or (b) a decrease in the values of both perceived ease of use and
perceived usefulness but an increase in the value of system usage. We might believe, for instance,
that such events would occur only for information system users who are irrational (those outside the
boundary of our theory). In this light, the following two events are examples of those we deem to be
unlawful: <(8,4,5)(6,5,7)> and <(3,4,3)(5,3,1)>.
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Of the remaining lawful events, we might then deem any event involving a change in value of 6 or more in
both perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness falls outside the boundary of our theory. In other
words, our theory is not intended to cover events that involve large changes of values in these constructs.
We might believe, for instance, that such events would occur only when some other infrequently occurring
factor has had a major impact on information system users and, thus, our ability to explain and predict
system usage via our theory is undermined. As a result, the following two events are examples of events
that would fall outside the boundary of our theory: <(8,8,9)(7,2,1)> and <(3,3,1)(4,10,8)>.
As with states, our TAM example illustrates that practically, for many theories, each event in the set of
conceivable events of a theory cannot be considered to determine whether it falls within the boundary
of the theory because the number of conceivable events is too large. In this light, theorists might seek
to identify the characteristics of extreme events or unlikely events and to indicate whether such
events fall inside or outside the boundary of their theory. As with states, however, crafting a clear
narrative that describes the inside-boundary events is often difficult. For this reason, it too is often
missing or treated only cursorily in theoretical accounts.

4.2. Whole
A theory has emergent attributes – attributes of the theory as a whole rather than attributes of its
parts. Many such attributes exist, and researchers often differ in their views on the significance they
ascribe to each of them. Nonetheless, some emergent attributes have widespread acceptance among
researchers as being significant when assessing the quality of a theory. The following subsections
explain the nature of these attributes and describe criteria that can be used to evaluate the extent to
which a theory possesses them. Figure 3 provides an overview of the analysis that follows.

Figure 3. Framework and Criteria for Evaluating a Theory’s “Whole”

4.2.1. Importance
The importance (or utility) of a theory is often assessed via judgments made about the importance of
its focal phenomena (Corley & Gioia, 2011, pp. 17-19). Usually, there is little point to having a theory
with rigorously specified constructs, associations, inside-boundary states, and inside-boundary events
if it addresses uninteresting phenomena (Weber, 2003a). The focal phenomena might be deemed
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important from the viewpoint of practice (improving the effectiveness and efficiency of some entity’s
activities). They might also be deemed important from the viewpoint of research (science). Potentially,
enhanced understanding of the focal phenomena will provide key insights that enable theoretical or
empirical progress to be made on some problem within a discipline.
Ex ante it might be difficult to judge the importance of a theory. At the outset, its potential impact on
researchers and practitioners might be difficult to evaluate. Moreover, sometimes a theory provides
insights not anticipated when it was first articulated. Such insights arise only when researchers
engage with the theory and use it to inform their empirical work.
Ex post, however, various metrics can be used to assess the importance of a theory. For example,
the extent to which researchers cite a theory provides an indicator of its impact on their work and,
thus, its likely importance to them. Similarly, whether the theory underpins consulting work that
practitioners undertake or provides the foundation for a successful patent or motivates the
establishment of a new company is an indicator of its importance.
Citation evidence must be treated cautiously when it is used as a proxy for the importance of a
theory. Some theories are appealing to researchers because they are relatively simple to test
empirically. They are perceived as an easy route to journal publications. Whether they provide deep
insights into the phenomena they cover, however, is another matter.

4.2.2. Novelty
The extent to which a theory is novel is an important factor determining (a) the value ascribed to it by
researchers, and (b) the likelihood that papers describing the theory will be accepted for publication in
major journals (e.g., Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007; Mone & McKinley, 1993; Corley & Gioia, 2011).
Thus, judgments about a theory’s novelty or originality and judgments about its contributions to
knowledge appear to be closely related. Moreover, “revelatory” or “transformative” theoretical
insights, in contrast to “incremental” theoretical insights, seem to be especially valued (Corley &
Gioia, 2011, pp. 16-18).
Weber (2003b) describes several ways in which a theory might make novel contributions to a
discipline. First, a theory’s focal phenomena might not have been covered by prior theories. However,
if the theory is simply a slightly modified version of an existing theory that has been applied to new
phenomena, it is unlikely to be deemed novel. Second, a theory might be considered novel because it
frames or conceives existing, well-known focal phenomena in new ways. For example, Lamb and
Kling (2003) is a well-cited paper, perhaps because it argues phenomena associated with information
system users need to be considered from a broader, social-actor perspective rather than a narrow,
individualistic perspective (the latter perspective previously had been dominant in the literature).
Third, a theory’s novelty might arise because of important changes it makes to an existing theory – it
might add and/or delete constructs and associations, define existing constructs and associations
more precisely, or specify the boundary of the theory more precisely.
A theory will be deemed novel (perhaps after some time has elapsed) to the extent it changes the
paradigms used by researchers to investigate phenomena within their discipline (Kuhn, 1996). It will
command the attention of researchers if it provides a way of resolving “anomalies” within their
discipline – that is, empirical observations of phenomena that existing theories are unable to explain
or predict. It will also command the attention of researchers if it enables them to “see” or conceive
new and interesting phenomena (phenomena that previously escaped their attention) or
reconceptualize existing phenomena in new and interesting ways. Such theories break the cycle of
“normal science” within a discipline and set new paths for the discipline to follow.
The quality of the rhetoric used by researchers to describe their theories also appears to be an
important factor in determining the extent to which their theories are deemed novel (Locke & GoldenBiddle, 1997). Because science is a social phenomenon, researchers have to convince their colleagues
that their work has value. In this light, the arguments researchers use to expound their theories’ novelty
must be crafted carefully; otherwise, their theories’ contribution to knowledge might be overlooked.
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After analyzing 82 papers published in the Academy of Management Journal and Administrative
Science Quarterly (two high-quality, high-impact journals) between January 1976 and September 1996,
Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997) concluded that researchers who had successfully demonstrated the
novelty or contribution of their research use two rhetorical strategies. First, they “legitimize” their work by
“constructing intertextual coherence.” They “re-present and organize existing knowledge so as to
configure a context for contribution” (p. 1029) (see also Webster & Watson, 2002). Second, they
“subvert” or “problematize” the existing literature. They do so to show that opportunities exist for
contributions to knowledge. One way in which the novelty of a theory can be assessed ex ante,
therefore, is to evaluate how well its proponents enact Locke and Golden-Biddle’s two strategies.

4.2.3. Parsimony
High-quality theories are parsimonious (e.g., Hempel, 1966, pp. 40-45; Popper, 2005, pp. 131, 272).
They achieve good levels of predictive and explanatory power in relation to their focal phenomena
using a small number of constructs and associations. By using a small number of constructs, they
also limit the size of their conceivable state space and conceivable event space. As a result, it is often
easier to articulate the nature of states and events that fall within the boundary of the theory. Thus,
the boundary of parsimonious theories often can be stated more precisely because the class (or
classes) of things, associations, states, and events covered by the theory can be defined precisely.
What constitutes a “small number” is in the eyes of the beholder. Nonetheless, Miller’s (1956) classic
paper on the “magical number seven, plus or minus two” suggests some guidelines. Humans appear
able to manipulate about seven “chunks” of information in short-term memory. In this light, one might
predict researchers would deem a theory to be parsimonious if it has no more than about seven
constructs and seven associations (and perhaps the desired number in each case is less than seven)
and the number of inside-boundary states and inside-boundary events is not large.
When building a theory, researchers are often tempted to include more constructs and more
associations in an attempt to capture the “richness” of the phenomena they are seeking to predict or
explain (and my experience is the inclusion of more constructs and associations is often a frequent
request made by the reviewers of journal papers!). Parsimony dictates, however, that some constructs
and associations must be omitted from a theory. In choosing constructs to omit, those whose instances
have little variation in their values (states) are likely candidates. In choosing associations to omit, those
where few instances of constructs are related to other instances of constructs are likely candidates.
Often, a trade-off must be made between parsimony and a theory’s predictive and/or explanatory
power. As the number of constructs and associations increases, the theory might be better able to
predict and/or explain the focal phenomena. Nonetheless, at some point, users of the theory will
deem it to be too complex. The goal is to achieve high levels of prediction and/or explanation with a
small number of theoretical components (Ockham’s Razor).

4.2.4. Level
Some theories cover a very narrow, constrained set of phenomena. They are often called “microlevel” theories. On the one hand, a micro-level theory’s constructs and associations might be defined
precisely. Moreover, its predictive and/or explanatory powers might be high in relation to the
phenomena it covers. Because of the limited range of phenomena it covers, however, it runs the risk
it will be deemed uninteresting and unimportant.
Some theories cover a broad range of phenomena. They are often called “macro-level” theories. In
some ways, a macro-level theory might be compelling because it provides broad, overall insights into
many phenomena. It has a high level of generality. Often, however, its constructs and associations are
defined imprecisely. As a result, its predictive and/or explanatory powers in relation to the more-specific
phenomena that are a researcher’s focus are limited. In this regard, Weick (1995, pp. 389-390) points
out that generality can be attained only by trading off a theory’s accuracy and/or simplicity (parsimony).
Moreover, if a theory is at too high a level and too general, it runs the risk that eventually it will be
discredited because it ends up as a “theory of everything” in a discipline (e.g., see Davis, 2010, pp. 697699) criticisms of New Institutional Theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in organizational research).
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Merton (1957) argues the primary theories used in a discipline ought to be “middle-range” (or “mesolevel”) theories. On the one hand, such theories avoid “narrow empiricism.” On the other hand, they
avoid being so general in their coverage that it is difficult, if not impossible, to test them empirically.
Moreover, meso-level theories often have value because they link the micro-level world and macrolevel world in a discipline.
In spite of the wide acceptance of Merton’s idea within many disciplines, the precise meaning of
“middle-range theories” remains problematic (Boudon, 1991). Whether a theory is set at an
appropriate level is a subjective matter. Also, a level that is too high or too low in one discipline might
be an appropriate level in another discipline. Nonetheless, in the context of their discipline, in due
course researchers make judgments about whether a theory is formulated at an appropriate level –
whether it is too specific or too broad to be interesting and/or useful.

4.2.5. Falsifiability
Most, if not all, theories cannot be proven via empirical tests, because it is impossible to test the theory
for all things, all instances of associations, all states, and all events that fall within its boundary. Instead,
support for a theory grows when its powers of prediction and/or explanation remain robust across
different tests of the theory (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, pp. 202-218; Hempel, 1966, pp. 33-46). If the theory
has been articulated clearly, these tests can be designed strategically. They can be used to examine
conditions researchers believe are most likely to lead to the theory being falsified (failing the empirical
test) rather than supported (Doty & Glick, 1994; Popper, 2005, pp. 57-73). They facilitate “risk-taking”
tests of the theory – tests that are likely to disconfirm the theory rather than to support it.
To be capable of falsifying a theory, researchers must be capable of generating precise predictions
about the focal phenomena so they can undertake reasonably exact empirical tests of the theory. If
the predictions they are able to generate are so vague that the status of empirical tests they
undertake always remains problematic or, alternatively, the empirical outcomes can always be
finessed (explained) using the theory, the value of the theory is undermined.
Similarly, if the classes of things, associations, states, and events that fall within the boundary of a theory
are unclear, the meaning that can be ascribed to empirical tests that fail to support the theory is unclear.
The results may simply mean that an invalid and unreliable empirical evaluation of the theory has been
undertaken, or the evaluation applies to states and events that fall outside the theory’s domain.
High-quality theories also suggest the kinds of empirical work that might lead them to be falsified (or
conversely receive strong confirmation). For example, their putative applicability to a wide variety of
phenomena will be clear (Hempel, 1966, pp. 33-37). Thus, researchers can infer how to test the theory
under a large number and a great diversity of conditions. As discussed above, high-quality theories also
enable researchers to “see” new phenomena – phenomena not conceived or considered at the time the
theory was formulated (Hempel, 1966, pp. 37-38). Such phenomena provide strong tests of the theory
because a priori the theory was not formulated to take these phenomena into account.

5. Using the Evaluation Framework and Criteria: An Example
To show how the evaluation framework and criteria I have proposed above can be used to pinpoint the
strengths and weaknesses of a theory, assess the likely usefulness of a theory, highlight areas where
empirical tests of the theory are likely to be problematic, and identify opportunities for refining and
enhancing the theory, in the subsections below, I examine a paper by Griffith, Sawyer, and Neale
(2003). This paper examines “the dynamics of knowledge development and transfer in more and less
virtual teams” (p. 265). This paper is one of several published in a special issue of the MIS Quarterly on
the topic of “Redefining the Organizational Roles of Information Technology in the Information Age.” The
stated purpose of the special issue was to “stimulate significant and innovative theoretical thought
in response to the dramatic changes that had occurred in the 1990s regarding information technology
and the transformational ways in which information technology was being applied to enable new forms
of organizations and markets” (emphasis in original) (Zmud, 2003, p. 195).
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In spite of the special issue’s focus on “significant and innovative theoretical thought,” it is unclear
whether Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper articulates a theory or a model. Recall, contrary to some
scholars (e.g., Dubin, 1978; Whetten, 1989), I have argued above that not all models are theories,
whereas theories are models that possess specific attributes. The distinction is important, because I
have argued theories must satisfy certain standards of rigor, whereas models can be used to lay
broad foundations for understanding particular phenomena.
On the one hand, Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper states it “advances theory” (p. 265). Moreover, it
articulates a number of propositions, which suggests its focus is theory building. On the other hand, it
also states it is presenting a “stylized model” (my emphasis) of “individual and social knowledge…and
how knowledge transfers among individuals and becomes available to the members of the team” (pp.
268-269). Moreover, throughout the paper, the term “model” is used frequently. Nonetheless, the legend
for Table 1 of the paper (p. 281) is “Operationalization of Constructs to Test the Theoretical Model” (my
emphasis), which suggests the model articulated in the paper is, indeed, meant to be a theory. In any
event, for the sake of illustrating how the evaluation framework and criteria might be used, I have
assumed Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper presents a theory of virtualness and knowledge in teams.
In evaluating Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper, I am acutely aware from my own work that theory building
is often an extended process that involves many painstaking iterations (see, in particular, Weick’s
(1995) eloquent arguments about the process of theory building versus the product of theory
building). In this regard, Griffith and her colleagues have continued to refine their “stylized model” to
improve its rigor and, thereby, to better satisfy the conditions I propose for a model to be called a
theory (Cadiz, Sawyer, & Griffith 2009; Griffith & Sawyer, 2010). Again, my purpose in evaluating
Griffith et al.’s paper is to illustrate how the framework and criteria I propose can be usefully
employed. Moreover, I am seeking to develop rather than to subvert or denigrate the substantial
contribution that Griffith et al. have made. Like Gray and Cooper (2010, p. 622), I believe we invest
too little effort in developing existing theories compared to constructing new theories. As a result, we
have a “clutter” of partially articulated, partially tested theories in the information systems discipline
that leads to “overload” and “disarray.”

5.1. Parts
In this subsection, I evaluate how rigorously the constructs, associations, states, and events have
been articulated in Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory. In this regard, while the evaluation framework and
criteria I have proposed above pinpoint those parts of the theory that need to be assessed, readers of
the theory still need to make their own judgments about how rigorously each part has been expressed
(accordingly, my evaluation below reflects my own judgments). Even where judgments about rigor
differ, however, the evaluation framework and criteria provide a way for researchers to structure their
discourse about the quality of a theory’s components.

5.1.1. Constructs
Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper presents constructs in four places. First, they are shown in Figure 2 (the
“stylized model”) of the paper (p. 269). Second, they can be gleaned from the 19 propositions stated
in the paper (pp. 271-278). Third, Table 1 of their paper (p. 281) is intended to “catalogue the
constructs and assessments necessary to test our model” (p. 280). Fourth, specific constructs are
discussed at various places in the text of the paper.
A first problem with the paper’s articulation of constructs is that inconsistencies exist among those
shown in Figure 2 of the paper, those embedded within the propositions in the paper, and those listed
in Table 1 of the paper. In this regard, Figure 2 of the paper appears to show 17 constructs employed
in the theory. In my reading of the propositions, however, I can identify potentially 31 different
constructs (see my Table 2 below). Yet Table 1 of Griffith et al.’s paper shows only 15 constructs that
must be subject to “assessments.”
At first glance, some inconsistencies appear to represent only naming inconsistencies. For example,
Figure 2 of Griffiths et al. (2003) shows a construct called “Individualized Knowledge: Implicit,” which
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is cross-referenced to Proposition 2 (P2) in the paper. Based on the label given to this construct, one
might expect it refers to the level or amount of implicit knowledge that a member of a virtual team
possesses. The focus of Proposition 2, however, is on the extent to which implicit knowledge can be
transferred to explicit knowledge. These are not the same constructs, even though the words “implicit
knowledge” are used in both. Furthermore, the “assessment” (operationalization) of the “Individual
Knowledge Types: Implicit” construct in Table 1 of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper does not pertain to the
extent to which implicit knowledge can be transferred to explicit knowledge (the construct used in P2).
Rather, it refers to the “extent to which individuals rely on … knowledge which could be codified but
has been made automatic by practice” (p. 281).
A similar problem exists with a number of other constructs – that is, the meaning that, at first glance,
might be assigned to a construct shown in Figure 2 of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper does not match the
construct employed in the propositions (see Table 2 above). Moreover, in some cases, the construct
used in the propositions (see Table 2 above) does not match the construct in Table 1 of their paper.
Table 2. Constructs in Griffith et al.’s (2003) Theory of Virtualness and Knowledge in Teams
No.

Class of
Things

Attribute in General

Propositions in
Griffith et al.

Brief Assessment of Construct Definition

P1a, P1b, P3a,
P3b, P4a, P4b,
Defined clearly on pp. 267-268.
P5a, P5b, P9a,
P9b, P11a, P13

1

Team

Level of Virtualness

2

Team

Likelihood of Transforming Implicit
Knowledge into Explicit Knowledge

P1a

Nature of implicit and explicit knowledge defined
clearly on pp. 270-271. Likelihood of transformation
defined somewhat indirectly.

3

Team

Likelihood of Having Access to Extant
Explicit Knowledge

P1b

Nature of explicit knowledge defined clearly on pp.
270-271. Likelihood of having access defined
somewhat indirectly.

4

Team

Extent to Which Implicit Knowledge
Transferred to Explicit Knowledge

P2

Nature of implicit and explicit knowledge defined
clearly on pp. 270-271. Amount transferred defined
somewhat indirectly.

5

Team

Extent of Proactive Effort Made to
Verbalize Rules, Terminology, and
Descriptions

P2

Not defined clearly.

6

Amount of Tacit Knowledge Acquired
Team
from Co-located Sources Transferred
Member
to Team

P3a

Nature of tacit knowledge defined clearly on pp. 270271. Amount acquired from co-located sources and
transferred defined somewhat indirectly (a complex
attribute in general).

7

Team
Amount of Tacit Knowledge Acquired
Member from Teammates

P3b

Nature of tacit knowledge defined clearly on pp. 270271. Amount acquired from teammates defined
somewhat indirectly.

8

Team

Level of Difficulty in Forming Collective
Knowledge

P4a

Defined reasonably clearly on p. 273.

9

Team

Level of Experienced Richness of
Communication

P4a

Not defined clearly. Brief comment about
communication richness on p. 273.

10

Team

Amount of Collective Knowledge
Accessible Via Technological Tools

P4b

Not defined clearly.

11

Team

Likelihood of Enacting an Independent
Approach to Tasks

12

Team

Amount of Shared Understanding of
Tasks among Team Members

P5a

Nature of shared understanding defined clearly on p.
274. Amount of shared understanding defined
somewhat indirectly.

13

Team

Level of Interdependence of Work.

P5b

Defined reasonably clearly on p. 274.

14

Team

Level of Access to Tools and
Structures that Support Highly
Interdependent Work

P5b

Not defined clearly.

15

Team

Level of Appropriation of Tools and
Structures that Support Highly
Interdependent Work

P5b

Not defined clearly.

P5a, P5b

Defined reasonably clearly on p. 274.
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Table 2. Constructs in Griffith et al.’s (2003) Theory of Virtualness and Knowledge in Teams
(cont.)
No.

Class of
Things

16

Team

Attribute in General
Amount of Shared Knowledge

Propositions in
Griffith et al.

Brief Assessment of Construct Definition

P5b

Not clear whether shared understanding and shared
knowledge are the same constructs. See
Propositions 5a and 5b.

P6

Nature of potential knowledge defined clearly on p.
275. Nature of usable knowledge defined somewhat
indirectly on p. 275. Level of transition defined
somewhat indirectly.

17

Team
Level of Transition of Potential Team
Member* Knowledge to Usable Knowledge

18

Team
Level of Individual Absorptive Capacity
Member

19

Team
Level of Virtual Work/Teamwork
Member

P7

Nature of virtual work defined clearly on pp. 267-268.
Not clear whether virtual work and virtual teamwork
(both used in P7) are the same constructs.

20

Team
Level of Social Interaction of Team
Member Members

P7

Nature of social interaction defined somewhat
indirectly on p. 275. Level of social interaction
defined somewhat indirectly.

21

22

Team

Level of Transition of Potential
Knowledge to Usable Knowledge

Team
Level of Connections to Relevant
Member Communities of Practice

P6, P7

P8, P12

Defined clearly on p. 275.

Potential team knowledge and usable team
knowledge defined on pp. 269-270. Level of
transition between two types of knowledge defined
somewhat indirectly.

P8

Defined somewhat indirectly on p. 276.

P9a

Not clear whether construct 22 and this construct are
the same. Do “connections” and “access” have the
same meaning? Also, this construct applies to a
team whereas construct 22 applies to a team
member.

23

Team

Level of Access to Communities of
Practice

24

Team

Level of Tacit Knowledge from
Members’ Links to Communities of
Practice Disseminated within Team

P9b

Defined somewhat indirectly on p. 276.

25

Team

Level of Transfer of Potential
Knowledge to Usable Knowledge

P10

Potentially the same construct as construct 21. Do
“transfer” and “transition” have the same meaning?

26

Team

Level of Transactive Memory

P10

Nature of transactive memory defined clearly on p.
277. Level of transactive memory defined somewhat
indirectly.

27

Team

Level of Transactive Memory
Development

P11a, P11b

Nature of transactive memory development defined
clearly on p. 277. Level of transactive memory
development defined somewhat indirectly.

28

Team

Level of Virtual Work

P11b

Nature of virtual work defined clearly on pp. 267-268.
Level of virtual work defined somewhat indirectly.
Note that the level of virtual work seems to be an
attribute of both team (P11b) and team member (P7)
(see also line 19 in this table).

29

Team

Extent to Which Technologies of
Organizational Systems are Used to
Support Transactive Memory
Development

P11b

Not defined clearly.

30

Team

Level of Synergy

P12, P13

Nature of synergy defined clearly on p. 278. Level of
synergy defined somewhat indirectly.

Degree of Match Between Team Task
P13
Defined somewhat indirectly on p. 278.
and Technology Use
Note: “*” means it is unclear whether attribute in general belongs to the class “team” or “team member.”
31

Team

A second problem with the paper’s articulation of constructs (which is to some extent a corollary of
the first problem) is that some are defined rigorously (e.g., the level of team virtualness and
“individual knowledge types”) but others are not. Moreover, the meaning of some constructs has to be
elicited from the text used to articulate and support the propositions. Sometimes the meaning of these
constructs is clear; sometimes it is not.
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For example, a construct used in Proposition 4b of the paper is “Level of Collective Knowledge
Accessible Via Technological Tools.” Earlier in the paper (p. 273), collective knowledge is defined
reasonably precisely as “explicit knowledge that has been internalized by the team members.” What
is meant by “technological tools,” however, is discussed only somewhat obliquely. Nonetheless, it is
not clear which of the following meanings should be ascribed to the construct used in Proposition 4b
of the paper: (a) the nature of the collective knowledge formed by more-virtual teams means this
knowledge is easier to access via “technological tools,” or (b) more-virtual teams have more access
to or greater facility with “technological tools” and, thus, find it easier to access collective knowledge,
or (c) both meanings apply to the construct. If the theory is to be rigorously operationalized and
tested, the meaning of the construct must be clarified.
Table 2 above contains my assessment of the extent to which each construct used in Griffith et al.’s
(2003) paper has been defined rigorously. In part, some of the problems faced by Griffith et al. reflect
more general problems faced by scholars who work in the knowledge-management area. For
instance, whereas the meaning of constructs such as “amount” are straightforward in some domains
(e.g., the amount of a good produced), they are problematic in the knowledge management domain.
For example, what precisely is meant by the “amount of inflow of knowledge from both peer and
supervising units” (Griffith et al., 2003, p. 274, my emphasis)?
One approach Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper might have used to clarify the meaning of all constructs is
to employ a table similar to Table 2 above. Such a table could have shown the class of things that
underlie each construct (team or team member) and the attributes in general associated with each
class of things. To the extent possible, the table also could have provided a rigorous definition of the
construct. Where a rigorous definition for a construct was difficult to provide, the table could have
been used to indicate that further work was needed to refine the meaning of the construct. Other
scholars could then focus their work on articulating these constructs more clearly.
The term “boundary” is not used within Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper. Nonetheless, at one point the
paper indicates the theory is not applicable to all kinds of virtual teams: “[t]his model is presented
from the perspective of virtual teams where membership is relatively stable, but with members having
interaction both within the focal team, as well as with co-located others” (p. 269). Via this statement,
therefore, Griffith et al. are seeking to be specific about the class of things that their theory covers.
Use of the evaluation framework and criteria motivates considerations of whether the class of things
covered by Griffith et al.’s theory needs to be defined more precisely. For example: Does the theory apply
to all kinds of tasks a virtual team with a relatively stable membership might undertake? Does it apply when
the virtual team is made of members having substantial differences in culture? Does it hold throughout all
phases of the virtual team’s existence? Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper is silent on such questions.
In the absence of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper having defined all constructs precisely, it is difficult to
test their theory empirically. The reason is that valid and reliable measures cannot be devised for
constructs that are not defined rigorously. Table 1 of their paper (p. 281) shows a number of
constructs for which “[m]easures have to be developed,” but valid and reliable measures cannot be
developed unless the meaning of each construct is clear.

5.1.2. Associations
Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper states 19 propositions. Nine manifest a single directional association
between two constructs (five positive associations and four negative associations). Two (P5a and P7)
manifest two mediated associations involving three constructs (one construct is associated with
another construct that, in turn, is associated with another construct). Eight manifest moderated
associations – in other words, the “strength” of the directional association between two constructs is
moderated by a third construct. From an ontological perspective, all types of associations in Griffith et
al.’s (2003) theory manifest a hypothesized interaction between the constructs involved in the
association. In other words, they are postulating that the history of at least one of the constructs in the
association is not independent of the history of the other construct(s) in the association.

Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 13 Issue 1 pp. 1-30 January 2012

20

Weber/Evaluating and Developing IS Theory

The paper’s use of moderated associations strengthens the potential predictive and explanatory
power of the theory that has been articulated. Moreover, while the paper does not use the terms
“cause” and “causal” when discussing the propositions, nonetheless, causality is implied in the
arguments provided to support many of the propositions. For example, it seems clear the authors
believe the existence of virtuality in a team causes certain outcomes to occur in relation to how
different types of knowledge are transferred among team members (but perhaps they have cautiously
avoided use of causality terminology). To the extent the propositions imply causality either implicitly or
explicitly, the predictive and explanatory power of their theory is enhanced further.
Some of the arguments provided in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper to support a number of their
associations are rigorous and compelling. For instance, their Proposition 1a states (p. 271): “More
virtual teams are more likely to transform implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge than less virtual
teams.” The constructs of “level of team virtualness,” “implicit knowledge,” and “explicit knowledge”
are first defined carefully in the paper (pp. 267-271). Griffith et al. then provide compelling arguments
(p. 271) to support an association among these constructs – for example, “[t]eams who spend less
time together on task, are located further apart, and who make greater use of technological tools…will
be more likely to transfer knowledge in explicit…forms because the technology supports the
declarative nature of explicit knowledge.” They also cite earlier research to support their argument.
Two factors undermine the rigor of arguments provided by Griffith et al. (2003), however, to support other
associations. First, as discussed above, some constructs are not defined clearly. As a result, the meaning
of any associations that employ these constructs will lack clarity in some respects. Second, because of the
large number of constructs and associations employed in the theory, it is difficult to provide rigorous
argumentation to support them all. Inevitably, some associations will be better argued than others.
For instance, Proposition 5b in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper states: “Access to and appropriation of tools
and structures that support highly interdependent work will moderate this result on shared knowledge.”
By “this result,” Griffith et al. mean their previous proposition (Proposition 5a), which states: “More virtual
teams have a greater likelihood of enacting an independent approach to their tasks and, therefore, are
expected to have less shared understanding of their tasks than less virtual teams.”
In my view, the constructs in Proposition 5b called “Level of Access to Tools and Structures that
Support Highly Interdependent Work” and “Level of Appropriation of Tools and Structures that
Support Highly Interdependent Work” are not defined rigorously (see Table 2 above). What exactly is
meant by “access”? What exactly is meant by “appropriation”? Are there trade-offs between “access”
and “appropriation”? For example, what happens when teams have high levels of access to tools that
support interdependent work but low levels of appropriation of these tools? Similarly, what happens
when teams have low levels of access to tools that support interdependent work but high levels of
appropriation of the tools that they can access? How is the extent to which tools support
interdependent work to be assessed? Is this an attribute in particular of a tool that exists
independently of humans? Or is this a “socially constructed” attribute in particular of a tool? Are
shared understanding and shared knowledge the same constructs (see Table 2 above)? As the
nuances in possible meaning of these constructs are teased out, the need for more careful
argumentation to support both Propositions 5a and 5b in Griffith et al. (2003) becomes apparent.
Because the paper does not specify all associations in the theory rigorously, a researcher’s ability to
test the theory empirically is undermined. Researchers will lack the understanding they need to be
able to evaluate whether the theory’s 19 propositions hold empirically when they observe the
outcomes of a test of the theory.
Moreover, the associations that underpin the nine directional and two mediated propositions in the theory
are subject to the paradox articulated by Meehl (1967) – namely, stronger research designs will yield
weaker tests of these associations (recall, the null hypothesis might be rejected because any covariation
detected by stronger empirical tests might reflect ambient noise in the data or an association that is
statistically significant but not practically significant). Ideally, Griffith et al. (2003) would have stated these
associations in functional form or provided values that they deem to be practically significant in terms of
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each association’s parameters (Edwards & Berry, 2010). However, the eight moderated associations in
Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory provide more theoretical precision than their directional associations and,
thus, allow stronger tests of their theory to be undertaken (Edwards & Berry, 2010).

5.1.3. States
Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper contains only a limited and somewhat indirect description of those states
that fall inside the boundary of their theory and those states that fall outside the boundary of their
theory. For instance, in their discussion of the “virtualness” construct, they indicate that pure face-toface teams are unlikely to occur in today’s technological environment and that pure virtual teams
(those that never meet face-to-face) differ in a “non-linear way” from teams where their members do
meet (if only occasionally) (p. 268). Thus, their theory covers states that apply to “hybrid teams” only
– those teams that do not have extreme values for the virtualness construct.
If, as I have argued, Griffith et al.’s theory has 31 constructs (see Table 2), the state space that arises
from the Cartesian product of the different sets of values that each of these constructs might assume
will be very large (even with a restricted range of values for the “virtualness” construct). It is
understandable, therefore, that Griffith et al. would have had difficulty crafting a narrative to describe
precisely the subset of the conceivable state space covered by their theory.

5.1.4. Events
As with states, Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper contains only a limited and somewhat indirect description
of those events that are inside the boundary of their theory and those events that are outside the
boundary of their theory. For instance, because their theory covers only a restricted range of values
for the “virtualness” construct, the events that their theory covers will be limited to those associated
with this restricted range of values for this construct (manifested in the before-state and after-state
pairs that are used to describe an event).
Nonetheless, the large conceivable state space associated with Griffith et al.’s theory leads to a large
conceivable event space. As a result, it is understandable that Griffith et al. will have had difficulty
crafting a narrative to describe the subset of the conceivable event space covered by their theory.

5.2. Whole
In this subsection, I evaluate the theory proposed in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper as a whole. The evaluation
of the theory’s emergent attributes is more of an exercise in judgment than the evaluation of its parts.

5.2.1. Importance
The introduction of Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper provides some clear and compelling reasons why the
theory’s domain phenomena are important for practice. The paper points out that the management of
teams and knowledge are important ways of creating “synergies in … resources” and “increased
value” for organizations (p. 266). Moreover, with the emergence and ongoing refinement and
development of collaboration technologies and the increasing globalization of workforces, virtual
teams are becoming more prevalent. Thus, the successful operation of virtual teams is now critical to
the success of many organizations (e.g., Lowry, Zhang, Zhou, & Fu, 2010).
From a research perspective, the paper argues the theory proposed potentially provides a foundation
for other researchers who wish “to identify the limiting conditions for effective learning and knowledge
transfer across the range of traditional, hybrid, and virtual teams” (p. 280). This outcome clearly has
been achieved, because Google Scholar™ shows Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper has been cited more
than 300 times. Many researchers have, thus, found the paper useful in their work.

5.2.2. Novelty
Prima facie, it does not appear Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper has been paradigm changing in the sense
it has fundamentally altered the ways researchers view phenomena associated with virtual teams and
knowledge transfer. Thus, the paper follows a normal-science approach (Kuhn 1996). Nonetheless,
the theory described in the paper can be deemed novel for several other reasons.
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First, at the time Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper was published, the theory proposed included a number
of constructs that, if not completely new, had received only cursory attention in the extant research
literature. For example, Table 1 of the paper (p. 281) shows several constructs that require
“measures to be developed.” Table 1 of the paper also contains a number of constructs that, to the
best of my knowledge, had not been canvassed extensively by researchers (e.g., “level of social
interaction limited by virtual work undertaken”).
Second, the paper includes a number of associations that had received either no or only cursory attention in
the research literature that existed at the time the paper was prepared. For example, based on the paper’s
analysis of existing literature, the eight moderated associations proposed in the theory appear to be new.
Third, the “package” of constructs and associations included in the theory was novel. While at the
time the paper was published other researchers might have canvassed subsets of the constructs and
associations covered by Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory, the “whole” was new. The theory covered teamvirtualness and knowledge-transfer phenomena in novel, interesting, and important ways.
In the context of Locke and Golden-Biddle’s (1997) two strategies for demonstrating the contribution
to knowledge of a piece of research, Griffith et al. (2003) first construct intertextual coherence using
Locke and Golden-Biddle’s tactic of “synthesized coherence” – making connections between
literatures that historically have been somewhat disjointed (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997, pp. 10301035). Their paper enacts Locke and Golden-Biddle’s second strategy, problematizing the existing
literature, by using the tactic of “incompleteness” – that is, showing the existing literature can be
characterized by knowledge gaps or lacunae (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997, pp. 1030-1035).
These tactics are manifested in the way the paper frames its contribution: “The model is largely drawn
from the extant literature….Our contribution is in combining the results from the prior literature in a
way that is amenable to an assessment of the opportunities and challenges presented by considering
more and less virtual teams from the perspective of knowledge” (p. 270). In this light, Griffith et al.’s
(2003) paper has tacitly followed Locke and Golden-Biddle’s recommendations for demonstrating
novelty and contribution via the rhetoric used to contextualize a piece of research. As a result, overall,
the paper’s rhetoric is engaging and compelling.

5.2.3. Parsimony
As I have indicated above, I believe the theory proposed in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper contains:
• 31 constructs (rather than 17 constructs, as shown in Figure 2 of the paper, or 15
constructs, as shown in Table 1 of the paper);
• 21 associations (these are manifested in 19 propositions in the paper).
Based on a simple count of the number of constructs and associations in the theory, it is difficult to
conclude it is parsimonious. As a result, one might predict this lack of parsimony would undermine the
theory’s impact on other researchers. Interestingly, as indicated above, citation data suggests
otherwise. Given the large number of citations to Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper, the theory proposed in
the paper clearly has engaged the interest of other researchers. Thus, contrary to expectations, lack
of parsimony has not weakened its impact.
Nonetheless, the large number of constructs and associations in Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory is likely
to undermine any attempts made to “prune” it – that is, to reduce the number of constructs and
associations and to articulate its inside-boundary states and inside-boundary events more precisely
(Leavitt et al., 2010). For instance, what are the implications for the theory if an empirical test shows
lack of support for one (or some subset) of its associations? Does “one null result or even a few null
results…really justify moving backwards in the logical chain to argue the theory is disconfirmed”?
(Leavitt et al., 2010, p. 646). Moreover, with so many constructs and associations, it will be difficult to
find a comparable theory against which the predictive and explanatory power of the theory can be
evaluated (Leavitt et al., 2010, pp. 649-654).
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5.2.4. Level
In my view, Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper has articulated a middle-range (meso) theory. The range of
phenomena the theory covers is reasonably broad. Thus, the authors cannot be accused of narrow
empiricism. Moreover, while a number of the constructs have yet to be defined rigorously and to be
operationalized, it is possible to conceive how ultimately these outcomes might be achieved. In short,
the theory is framed at a level that enables it to be employed to generate useful predictions about,
insights about, and understanding of the theory’s focal phenomena.

5.2.5. Falsifiability
I have argued above that some parts of the theory proposed in Griffith et al.’s (2003) paper have been
articulated clearly and other parts have not been articulated clearly. Where clarity exists, rigorous
empirical tests can be undertaken to test the theory. Potentially, the outcomes of such tests will lead
researchers to conclude the theory is not supported (i.e., the theory can be falsified). For those parts of
the theory that are not articulated clearly, however, attempts to falsify it are problematic. Empirical tests
that produce “unfavorable” outcomes may simply mean researchers have used invalid or unreliable
measures of constructs. Alternatively, they have failed to understand the nature of an association
between constructs. They also might have tested the theory in a context that falls outside its boundary.

5.3. Summary Evaluation
Table 3 provides a summary of the more-detailed evaluation I have carried out above of Griffith et
al.’s (2003) paper.
Table 3. Summary Evaluation of Griffith et al.’s (2003) Paper
Criterion

Summary Evaluation

Parts

Constructs

Associations

States
Events

Some constructs are defined precisely; others are not. Inconsistencies exist among the
definitions of some constructs at different places in the paper. Little discussion occurs on the
boundary of the theory in terms of the class of classes of things it covers. A brief comment is
made about the theory applying to virtual teams whose membership is relatively stable and
whose members have both remote and local interactions.
Use of moderated associations strengthens the potential predictive and explanatory power of
the paper. Some arguments used to support associations are rigorous and compelling. Others
are not clear and compelling, because they include constructs that are not defined precisely.
Moreover, the large number of constructs and associations employed makes rigorous
articulation of all associations difficult to accomplish.
Little discussion occurs on those states that are inside the boundary of the theory and those
that are outside the boundary of the theory.
Little discussion occurs on those events that are inside the boundary of the theory and those
that are outside the boundary of the theory.

Whole
Importance
Novelty
Parsimony
Level

Falsifiability

The paper provides clear and compelling reasons why the theory is important for practice. The
paper is highly cited, which manifests its substantial impact on other researchers.
The paper introduces new constructs and associations. It also covers team-virtualness and
knowledge-transfer phenomena in novel, interesting, and important ways. The theory covers
gaps or lacunae in the existing literature.
The theory is not parsimonious, because it has a large number of constructs and associations
and also covers many possible states and events.
The theory is framed at an appropriate level as a middle-range (meso) theory.
Those parts of the theory that have been articulated precisely can be subjected to rigorous
empirical tests. Thus, these parts potentially can be falsified. Those parts of the theory that
have not been articulated rigorously, however, are difficult to test empirically. Thus, the
outcomes of tests of these parts of the theory are problematic as a means of supporting or
falsifying the theory.
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6. Using the Framework and Criteria to Inform Theory
Refinement and Construction
The framework and criteria I have proposed can also be used to inform researchers seeking to refine
an existing theory or to build a new theory. As they construct their modified or new theory,
researchers should be mindful of matters they need to address from the perspective of achieving
high-quality outcomes in relation to the parts and whole of their theory. In essence, the framework
and criteria can be used to test the quality of the work they are undertaking as their refined or new
theory unfolds.
If researchers are seeking to refine an existing theory, the framework and criteria can first be used to
pinpoint areas where the existing theory can be improved. Researchers’ analyses might indicate some
constructs are not well defined, some associations are not articulated clearly, the inside-boundary states
and events have not been specified clearly, the theory lacks parsimony, and the importance of the
theory is not well argued. Researchers can then seek to rectify the problems they identify.
For instance, my analysis of Griffith et al. (2003) using the framework highlights some areas where their
theory might be improved. A number of their constructs and associations need to be defined more
rigorously, and the inside-boundary states and events of their theory need to be articulated more clearly.
Once these outcomes are achieved, it might be possible to see more clearly which constructs and
associations should be discarded from the theory because they are deemed not to be material in
explaining and predicting variations in the theory’s focal phenomena (usable team knowledge). As a
result, a more parsimonious version of the theory might be achieved. Moreover, a more rigorous
specification of constructs, associations, and inside-boundary states and events would facilitate more
rigorous empirical tests of the theory and, thus, an enhanced ability to falsify the theory.
If certain types of defects become apparent, however, researchers need to reflect carefully on the
merits of seeking to enhance the theory. For example, if the theory’s importance or novelty are
unclear, or it has been framed at an inappropriate level, researchers should be circumspect about
whether actions -- such as defining constructs more rigorously, providing a clearer rationale for
associations, and articulating inside-boundary states and events more completely -- will produce
substantial improvements in the quality of the theory.
For example, my analysis of Griffith et al.’s (2003) theory using the framework I have proposed shows
that it rates highly in terms of importance, novelty, and level. In this light, prima facie good reasons
exist to try to refine or enhance the theory rather than build yet another theory of virtual teams and
knowledge-transfer phenomena (Gray & Cooper, 2010; Hambrick, 2007). My analysis using the
framework pinpoints some ways in which an enhanced theory might be achieved.
If researchers are seeking to articulate a new theory, their first concern should be the choice of the
focal phenomena. They must select focal phenomena that their colleagues ultimately will deem to be
important, either because the focal phenomena’s importance is readily apparent, or the rhetoric the
researchers provide to support the importance of the focal phenomena is compelling. Sometimes a
key issue is to reframe well-known phenomena in new, interesting ways or to point out important
phenomena that previously had gone unseen (Weber, 2003a). The focal phenomena must also be
conceived at a level that allows a meso-level theory to be formulated.
Once the focal phenomena are defined clearly, researchers can then build the parts of the theory –
constructs, associations, inside-boundary states, and inside-boundary events. They can seek to
ensure the theory is falsifiable through clear, precise definitions or specification of the theory’s parts.
Through selective choice of constructs, associations, and inside-boundary states and events, they
can also seek to ensure the theory is parsimonious. They must then realistically evaluate their
theory’s “utility” and “originality” (Corley & Gioia, 2011). If they deem it to be useful and novel, they
must carefully craft their rhetoric with the objective of convincing their colleagues that their theory has
these characteristics (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997).
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7. Conclusions
The framework I have proposed above facilitates an evaluation of the quality of an existing theory. It
also informs researchers who are seeking to build a new theory or refine an existing theory. As they
construct their new or modified theory, they should be mindful of matters they need to address from
the perspective of achieving high-quality outcomes in relation to their theory’s parts and whole. In
essence, the framework and criteria can be used as a set of checkpoints to test the quality of the
work they are undertaking.
The framework does not assist, however, in choosing the focal phenomena and the ways these
phenomena might be conceived, nor does it assist in choosing a theory’s constructs, associations,
and inside-boundary states and events. To a large extent, these choices remain creative acts that
affect, in particular, the quality of the whole – a theory’s importance, its novelty, its parsimony, and so
on (Feyerabend, 1975; Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, pp. 39-73; Weick, 1989). In the information systems
discipline (and in a number of other disciplines), I believe a rich vein of research lies in seeking to
better understand the characteristics of those choices that lead to the articulation of high-quality, highimpact theories.
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